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responsibilities and privileges they typically assume for shaping and designing urban sanitation policy. They will also have to consider households as their clients, not merely passive beneficiaries of a sewer project. Considerable time and effort will have to be spent working with local communities and neighborhoods before construction can begin. Moreover, the agencies responsible for water and sewer planning will need new staff with different skills than the individuals they currently employ, or they will have to hire private consulting firms to provide such services.
'I his paper presents a case study of the sanitation situation in Semarang, Indonesia, that illustrates how an innovative set of tools can be used to estimate household demand for improved water and sanitation services. Through this study, we develop our concept of a partnership between neighborhoods and city government in more detail. In the next section of this paper, we provide some background on the sanitation-planning problem in developing countries. In the third section, we discuss our proposed new approach to sewer planning practice and the components of the "neighborhood deal." In the fourth section, we present the Semarang case study. The fifth section summarizes our findings and conclusions. * 
BACKGROUND
In most large cities in developing countries, only a small minority of households are connected to a sewer system. A tiny fraction of the waste water from those households connected to sewers is actually treated effectively at primary or secondary waste-water treatment plants. The reality, then, is that cities in developing countries are awash in human sewage. Groundwater is contaminated from pit latrines and septic tanks; drainage ditches and canals are full of human waste; and surface water bodies such as lakes, streams, rivers, and nearby bays are heavily polluted.
Many observers assume that, because conventional technological solutions to these problems are well understood (e.g., water-sealed toilets, sewerage systems, and waste-water treatment plants), what is needed is simply more money. Even when sufficient funds are available, however, there is great uncertainty in finding effective solutions to urban sanitation problems in developing countries. There are several reasons why improving sanitation service poses such a complicated policy and planning problem.
First, the costs of conventional waterborne sewerage solutions (e.g., on-site facilities such as water-sealed toilets, sewerage networks, and waste-water treatment) are expensiveon the order of US$25 to US$35 per household per month (Lauria, Whittington, and Choe 1998) . This is more than the total monthly income of many poor households in urban areas of some developing countries. Because the capital investments required for sewers and waste-water treatment facilities are so large, implementation of construction plans takes a long time and involves cities in capital financing Whittington, Davis, Miarsono, and Pollard arrangements with higher-level government authorities and private capital markets. Such long-term planning is problematic in low-income countries because poor households typically have high rates of time preference and short planning horizons (Poulos and Whittington forthcoming).
Second, sanitation improvements result in public health benefits that have a public goods character; the benefits received by one individual do not diminish the benefits available to another. Standard public goods theory indicates that collective action is often required for the efficient provision of such goods in order to avoid free riding. But household sanitation improvements such as the installation of watersealed toilets are not pure public goods; they also yield important private benefits, including convenience, time savings, and aesthetics (Whittington et al. 1993a (Whittington et al. , 1993b .
A third challenge to effective sanitation planning is the lack of public awareness of the health benefits of sanitation services. Despite the fact that public health benefits ensue from collective solutions to urban sanitation problems, the public may not fully understand or perceive the magnitude of these benefits (Esrey 1996; Esrey et al. 1989; Esrey, Habicht, and Casella 1992; Young and Briscoe 1987) . In this sense, sanitation improvements resemble "merit goods," and social marketing and political leadership may be required to implement a socially optimal investment program. This line of argument, however, has often led public health specialists, planners, and engineers to rely solely on their expert opinion and to ignore the presumably uninformed wishes of households (MacRae and Whittington 1988) .
Fourth, planners attempting to increase user fees in order to finance sanitation improvements often face a dilemma. Poor households are unable and unwilling to pay for sewer connections or waste-water treatment, while many richer households have already invested in individual solutions to their immediate problems (e.g., water-sealed toilets and septic tanks). Thus, it is likely that neither group will be inclined to participate in a collective agreement to improve public health conditions (Choe, Whittington, and Lauria 1996) . Quite reasonably, poor households are generally unwilling to address community-wide problems (such as sewage collection, solid waste removal, and flood drainage) until they have met their immediate household needs and have obtained the private benefits associated with improved household sanitation (e.g., water-sealed toilets). There is less justification for the public sector to subsidize private housing improvements such as the construction of watersealed toilets.
Fifth, sewer network design, construction, and operation are subject to a variety of economies of scale. Design engineers thus prefer to lay sewer pipe throughout a city and hope that households and businesses will connect. This approach requires that care must be taken to estimate demand for connections, something that is rarely done. If connec-Designing a "Neighborhood Deal "for Urban Sewers tion rates are low, public health and environmental objectives may not be fully achieved. Also, revenues will be lower than expected. The network design task itself will thus become much more complicated in terms of sizing and location of interceptor and trunk sewers (Lauria, Swarna, and Randall 1992) . A conventional sewer system may not function properly because of insufficient flows.
Sixth, large amounts of money are at stake in the way water and sewer projects are currently constructed and financed. A new policy framework for sewer planning will likely threaten established financial relationships and will meet strenuous opposition from some stakeholders in the current system (Lovei and Whittington 1993; Crane 1994; Tarr 1988 This approach has the important advantages of (1) substantially reducing transaction costs to the agency and (2) leaving the responsibility for a collective decision at the lowest possible administrative and political level, thus increasing the probability that the decision is responsive to local needs and desires. It might appear that transaction costs would merely be shifted from the planning agency to the neighborhood. In fact, we believe there are at least two reasons to believe that total transaction costs would be reduced. First, the neighborhood deal approach serves an important screening function. In many situations, neighborhood organizations should be able to easily determine whether the majority of households are interested in the neighborhood deal that the municipal planning agency is able to offer. If they are not interested, such a quick, decisive assessment of household demand can be quite valuable, and may be much harder for the planning agency to achieve. Second, if the majority of households in a neighborhood are interested, the neighborhood organization is more likely than the planning agency to be able to sort out any difficulties households may have in reaching a consensus.
Regardless of which of these two approaches is used to arrange for household financing of the neighborhood sewer network installation, there is still a household decision about whether or not to connect to the new sewer line. Clearly the collective, neighborhood-level decision regarding the installation of sewer lines and the household-level decision regarding a private sewer connection are interdependent. If members of a household do not want to connect to the sewer line, they may not want to pay for sewerline installation for the neighhorhood. Then again, if they own the dwelling, they may. By having sewer lines installed in the neighborhood, homeowners receive two benefits, even if they do not know whether they will connect. First, they purchase the option to connect at some time in the future. This option will increase the property value whether or not a connection is installed. Second, other households will likely connect, thus improving environmental quality in the neighborhood.
It is, however, certainly true that a household would need to know the costs of connecting to and using the sewerage system before it made a decision about whether or not it wanted its neighborhood to have sewer lines installed. In fact, there are many costs a household must consider when deciding whether or not its neighborhood should have sewer lines installed and whether it should connect to a sewer line if this were possible. First, it must consider the amount of, and financial arrangements available for, the assessment fee for the sewer line installation. Second, a connection fee must typically be paid to the water and sanitation authority by each household wanting to connect. Third, additional plumbing costs are associated with actually connecting the water-sealed toilet (and perhaps household "gray water" discharges) to the sewer pipe. The Whittington, Davis, Miarsono, and Pollard latter costs are likely to vary significantly from household to household. Fourth, if a household does not already have a water-sealed toilet, it must incur the costs of installing one. Fifth, households with a sewer connection must typically pay a monthly tariff. For those with a metered private water connection, this tariff may be a surcharge on a monthly water bill. For those without service, the monthly charge may simply be a fixed fee.
The different costs and prices that the household faces, along with the financial arrangements for paying them, can be influenced by policies of the municipal government and the water and sanitation authority. We refer to the bundle of all such policies as the neighborhood deal because it is useful to consider how the whole package of government policies appears to the neighborhood and to the household. There are thus many alternative "deal structures" that the agency responsible for sewerage could offer neighborhoods and households. Each must, however, specify the relationship between the collective decision necessary at the neighborhood level and the individual connection decision to be made by households.
In this context, it is easy to understand why investment strategies that exclude neighborhoods and households from the sanitation planning process have had such a high rate of failure. First, such approaches preclude neighborhood organizations and households from providing the sanitationplanning agency with essential feedback about household demand for infrastructure improvements before sewer lines are installed and investment mistakes are made. Second, current investment strategies do not ask neighborhood organizations to bear the transactions costs associated with achieving collective agreements among households, and it has generally proven too difficult and expensive for government to shoulder this responsibility. The Neighborhood Deal
In describing a feasible neighborhood deal to survey respondents and community meeting participants, we used photographs, drawings, and detailed information about the process by which an improved water and sanitation system might be installed and operated in Semarang. Enumerators provided this information to survey respondents in private, one-on-one interviews, while community meeting facilitators presented and discussed the "deal" with groups of participants in an open format.
Only 3 percent of survey respondents were familiar with the concept of a sewer system prior to their interview. Many respondents devoted significant time to studying the visual aids and asking questions about the system, which was described as having two components. A network of underground pipes would deliver potable water to households and would remove human wastes and waste water; a treatment plant would be constructed to treat waste water before it was discharged into the ocean. Respondents were told that such a system would provide reliable and high-quality water supply; improvements in neighborhood sanitary conditions; and a reduction in some types of water pollution and wellwater contamination. 5 Once respondents understood how such a system would function in Semarang, enumerators described the process by which it might be installed and financed. It was explained to respondents that the installation of an improved water supply and sanitation system would entail a two-stage process.
First, RTs that wished to participate in the program would be required to raise the funds necessary to pay an assessment fee. Government would also contribute moneys, and these funds would be used to lay the neighborhood water and sewer lines from the major (trunk) pipes to each participating RT. Respondents were told that consensus must be reached within a RT for participation in the project, as every household in the district would be assessed a share of the 50,000, 150,000, 300,000, or 500,000 Rp. for full service; 25,000, 75,000, 150,000 or 250,000 Rp. for self help Whittington, Davis, Miarsono, and Pollard installation fee, whether or not it decided to connect to the water and sewer system.
In crafting a credible neighborhood deal for improvements in Semarang's water supply and sanitation, we drew on the tradition of "self-help" programs extant in many areas ofJavanese society.16 Each RT participating in the program would have to decide whether to use an engineering contractor ("full service") or an engineering consultant ("self help"). Under the full-service plan, the contractor would design and carry out the installation of interceptor sewers. With the self-help option, residents of the RT would share the responsibilities of digging trenches, laying pipe, and other low-skill tasks, under the supervision of an engineering consultant. Respondents were told to assume that the assessment fee associated with the full-service would be twice that of the self-help plan. Residents of a RT would thus have to weigh the relative advantages of expertise, cost savings, and expediency in deciding whether the full-service or self-help approach were more desirable.
Once arrangements for an RT's participation in the program were finalized, individual households would face a choice of their own: Private connections would be provided only to those households desiring and able to pay for one. Households with existing water connections would have the option of adding a sewer connection. Those without water service could have both a water and sewer connection installed (a water connection without an accompanying sewer connection was not offered as an option).
The different costs and prices of the project were carefully explained to survey respondents and community meeting participants (see Table 1 ). A fixed assessment fee the cost per household of having neighborhood water and sewer lines installed-would be charged to each household. Under the full-service plan, this fee varied randomly between 50,000 (US$24), 150,000 (US$71), 300,000 (US$143), and 500,000 Rp. (US$238) for different questionnaire versions; that is, each respondent received only one of these A unique aspect of the household survey was the classification of responses to questions about respondents' willingness-to-pay for improved water supply and sanitation. During questionnaire development, enumerators felt that some respondents would find it difficult to reject openly the improved water supply and sanitation program described in the questionnaire. Within the Javanese culture, they explained, it is common to provide an ambivalent rather than a negative response, with both the speaker and listener tacitly understanding the true intention of the comment. It was thus important for enumerators to distinguish this type of rejection from true uncertainty on the respondent's part. Working with the team of enumerators, we generated a list of ways in which residents of Semarang tell one another no," and enumerators were asked to indicate on each questionnaire the precise manner in which a respondent provided his or her answer.
Household Survey Results
The results of the first question, regarding whether or not the respondent wished for his or her neighborhood to paroportion ofrespondents preferring no particiPation, full serelp plan in theirRT Full Service Assessment Fee (1,000 Rp.) 303 vice; cor 3-cJ-"Je ticipate in the program for an assessment fee of a specified amount, are presented in Figure 1 . The proportion of households that wish for their neighborhood to participate is relatively low at each of the specified assessment fees. Even with a very low per household assessment fee of 50,000 Rp.
(US$24) for the full-service plan, only 53 percent of respondents favored their RT's participation in one of the two service programs (i.e., full service or self help). These were relatively evenly split between the full-service plan (58 percent) and the self-help plan (42 percent). As the assessment fee increases, the proportion of respondents favoring their RT's participation in the program generally decreases (which increases our confidence that respondents were listening to the questions asked and attempted to give honest answers).2' At the highest assessment fee of 500,000 Rp., only 10 percent of the respondents wanted the full-service plan, and only about 15 percent wanted the self-help plan. Figure 2 shows that households that already have a private water connection were more likely to want their RT to participate than households without a private water connection. This was true at each of the four assessment fees. For example, at the lowest assessment fee of 50,000 Rp.(US$24), over half of the respondents with private water connection wanted their RT to participate, whereas fewer than 20 percent of households without water connections supported the program. Figure 2 also shows that the effect of increasing the assessment fee is both more consistent and more pronounced for households with private connections than for households without private connections.
The data presented in Figure 2 are difficult to interpret given the small size of our sample. If it is true that, other things equal, households with private water connections have a higher demand for the neighborhood deal than do households without private water connections, this will have important implications for project design. It would suggest that a strategy of trying to get unconnected households to take both water and sewer services might result in many households taking neither, and that an attempt to bundle water and sewer services may be ill advised. However, this result could simply be due to an income effect, i.e., households that have private connections are richer than households without private connections, and their greater wealth may be the reason why they exhibit stronger demand for the neighborhood deal. This result could also be caused by a price effect; households with private water connections would incur lower connection costs as compared to those of households without private water connections. More needs to be learned, however, about exactly what of strategic bias does not seem to us to be large in this study because it is not obvious how respondents should answer if they wished to behave strategically. For examiiple, it seems equally plausible that a respondent trying to answer strategica,lly would have answered "yes" to oLur CV questions in hopes of etct)iLraging the government to provide the services, knowing that after the sewer lines were installed that it mnight not be able to raise prices or collect monthly water and sewer bills. In fact, these days most CV researchers are more concernied about "yea saying" than strategic "no" responses, and would probably find such a high percentage of respondents answering "n1o" tO lend credibility tO otii StliVCy.
